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Abstract
Razin and Sadka (1999) show that unskilled immigration is beneficial to all income
and all age groups in society, even if immigrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare
system. Among other things, this result rests on the assumptions that immigrants
have the same reproduction rate as the native population and that the immigrants’
offspring has the same distribution of skills as the natives’ offspring. By relaxing these
assumptions, we show that the Razin and Sadka result is no longer unambiguous.
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Introduction
In most OECD countries, pay-as-you-go financed pension systems suffer from de-
mographic problems. From the ageing of societies it inevitably follows that either
pension benefits must fall or contribution rates must increase. Because of this, immi-
gration of young workers has frequently been proposed as a means to overcome the
ageing problem. It increases the number of contributors to the pension system which
helps to dampen the negative effects of ageing on contribution rates and benefits.
This argument has been formalized by Razin and Sadka (1999, 2000)2 who intro-
duced a model in which they investigate the impact of young unskilled immigration
on the pension system in an OLG model with two generations. They find that in
this dynamic setup immigration is beneficial to all income and to all age groups (or
at least, it does not harm any group), even if the immigrants are net beneficiaries of
the welfare system. The reason for this result is that the net costs imposed by the
immigrants are transferred into the indefinite future. Hence, in a politico-economic
sense all generations will vote in favor of immigration.
The model, however, rests on several rather strong assumptions. In this note, we will
mainly turn to the assumption that the reproduction rates of natives and immigrants
are equalized as soon as the immigrants enter the country and that the joint rate
will be the natives’ one. Furthermore, we relax the assumption that the ability (in
the sense of acquired destination country-specific human capital) of the immigrant’s
offspring is distributed identically to that of the natives. Therefore, we will allow
for (i) differing fertility rates between natives and immigrants and (ii) different skill
distribution of the natives’ and the immigrants’ offspring.
We find that under real-world assumptions, i.e. immigrants having a higher fertility
rate than natives and the skill distribution being skewed in favor of the natives,
there are two offsetting effects on the expected pension benefit of today’s working
generation. Depending on the parameter values, either the positive fertility effect
or the negative skill effect will dominate and cause the workers either to accept
or to reject young unskilled immigration. Hence, even if interest rates and wages
are constant (as in RS) two externalities result from immigration: A positive one
2We refer to these articles from now on as RS.
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on the domestic retirees due to higher total contributions and an ambiguous one on
domestic workers and future generations which depends on the two before mentioned
effects. If in total a positive redistributive effect towards the domestic population
occurs, one can consider this to be an ”entrance fee”, as Sinn (2001) puts it, for the
immigrants.
Labor supply
In the following, we will use a simplified version of RS’s model in which we neglect the
education decision of workers. It is assumed that there are two groups of homogenous
workers in the beginning. The population is normalized to unity. Let st be the share
of skilled workers, and let ut be the share of unskilled workers. So, we have st+ut = 1.
There are mt immigrants allowed into the country in period t, which are assumed
to be unskilled.
The effective labor supply in t is given by
Lt = st + qut + qmt = (1− q)st + (1 +mt)q, (1)
where q < 1, i.e. unskilled workers provide only q units of effective labor per unit of
working time, and where ut is substitued by 1− st.
In contrast to RS, we assume that fertility rates between natives and immigrants may
differ. We call the native’s rate nt and the immigrant’s rate ent, so RS assume: nt =ent.3 Furthermore, we assume that a share α, where α ∈ [0, st], of the immigrant’s
offspring will become skilled in period t+ 1. This means that the share of unskilled
children of immigrants ranges between the level of the native population, which is
1 − st, and unity.4 Or to put it the other way round: we assume that in the long
3The assumption is quite common in this strand of the literature (see Krieger (2001) for a
survey of the recent literature on immigration and pensions).
4We can interpret this assumption in the following way: It takes some (costless) integration
effort on the part of the natives to have the immigrant’s offspring attain the same skill distribution
as the native’s offspring, e.g. by communicating with the immigrants’ children in order to help
them improve their language skills etc. If no integration effort takes place, the entire immigrants’
offspring remains unskilled. Otherwise, at least some percentage of the immigrants’ children will
become skilled, i.e. they will be able to compete with skilled natives for jobs.
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run it is not possible for immigrants to perform better than natives (in the sense of
becoming skilled workers).5 The parameter α is exogenously given and may differ
between societies.
The effective labor supply in t+ 1 turns out to be
Lt+1 = st+1 + qut+1
= st(1 + nt) + αmt(1 + ent) + q [ut(1 + nt) + (1− α)mt(1 + ent)]
= (1 + nt) [(1− q)st + q] + (1 + ent)mt [(1− q)α+ q] . (2)
We can easily derive RS’s result by taking nt = ent and α = st. Then, equation (2)
collapses to Lt+1 = (1 + nt)(1 +mt) [st + qut].
The pension system
As in RS, we assume that in each period t workers pay contributions to the pension
system which are transferred to the retirees as demogrant benefits pt. Contributions
take the form of a payroll tax where τ t is the tax rate per unit of income. Hence, in
period t the budget equation of the pay-as-you-go pension system is given by
τ twt (st + q(ut +mt)) = pt (st−1 + ut−1) (3)
where the bracketed terms are the relevant labor supplies in each period. Making
use of (1) and the fact that (st + ut) = (1 + nt−1) (st−1 + ut−1), we can solve (3) for
pt:
pt = (1 + nt−1)τ twt [(1− q)st + (1 +mt)q] . (4)
Taking the derivative with respect to immigration mt shows that an increasing
number of immigrants raises the pension benefit ( ∂pt∂mt = (1 + nt−1)τ twtq > 0). This
is because, for a given contribution rate, immigration increases total contributions.
5This may be due to the fact that both groups will attend the same school system.
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A constant number of retirees will therefore enjoy higher benefits. Retirees in period
t will in any case gain from immigration.
Turning now to the situation in period t+ 1, we can derive a new budget equation
of the pension system. To do so, we have to take into account the labor supply from
equation (2):
τ t+1wt+1 {(1 + nt) [(1− q)st + q] + (1 + ent)mt [(1− q)α+ q]} = pt+1 (st + ut +mt)
(5)
Notice that st+ut = 1 on the right-hand side. Hence, solving for pt+1 leaves us with
pt+1 = τ t+1wt+1
(1 + nt) [(1− q)st + q] + (1 + ent)mt [(1− q)α+ q]
1 +mt
. (6)
Again, the RS result can be established by assuming nt = ent and α = st. Then the
pension benefit is pt+1 = τ t+1wt+1(1 + nt) [st + qut].
Taking the derivative of (6) with respect to nt, ent, st, q, and α gives the expected
positive signs. If either one of the two reproduction rates increases, there will be
more contributors to the pension system, i.e. the demogrant benefit increases. If the
share of skilled workers in the total population increases or if the productivity q
of unskilled workers is raised (e.g. due to an improved school system), the effective
labor supply is higher and therefore total contributions are higher. Finally, if the
parameter α becomes higher (e.g. due to special training for immigrants), a larger
share of the immigrant’s offspring becomes skilled. Again, the productivity improves.
Let us now investigate whether the overall impact of immigration on the pension
benefit in period t+ 1 is positive. The first-order condition can be written as
∂pt+1
∂mt
=
τ t+1wt+1
(1 +mt)2
{(1 + ent)(1 +mt) [(1− q)α+ q]
− [(1 + nt) [(1− q)st + q]− (1 + ent)mt [(1− q)α+ q]]}. (7)
Simplifying this expression, we find that there is a positive impact of immigration
on pt+1, i.e. ∂pt+1∂mt > 0, if the following condition holds:
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(1 + ent)
(1 + nt)
> (1− q)st + q
(1− q)α+ q . (8)
We can look at some special cases to see the implications of equation (8). Let us
first consider the RS assumptions, i.e. nt = ent and α = st. Clearly, both sides of
(8) equal 1, so immigration has no impact on pension benefits in period t+ 1. This
is just the result derived by RS who show that immigration in period t leaves all
generations retiring in t+ 1 or later indifferent.
We now relax the assumption that the fertility rates have to be the same. It is
reasonable, at least for unskilled immigrants, to assume nt < ent.6 Taking the RS
case as a starting point, the left-hand side of (8) now increases and exceeds the
right-hand side. Hence, not only the retirees of the immigration period t (as in RS)
gain from immigration, but also the young and future generations.7
One can also keep the equality of fertility rates and allow for differences in the skill
distribution of both groups’ offspring. The right-hand side of (8) is 1 if the upper
limit of the domain of α is attained, i.e. if α = st. If 0 ≤ α < st, the right-hand
side becomes greater than 1. So, for nt = ent, any α < st causes a negative impact
of immigration on the pension benefit. The reason for this result is that due to
immigration the share of unskilled workers increases in period t + 1 compared to
the one in period t. The effective labor supply falls and the native workers have to
carry some of the burden of the immigrants.8 This is because an average immigrant’s
child contributes less to the pension system than an average native child. But at the
same time, the pension benefit is the same for natives and immigrants. Hence, some
6Storesletten (2000) finds that the average total fertility rate for medium- and low-skilled immi-
grants to the U.S. is 7 percent and 50 percent, respectively, higher than for natives. For high-skilled
immigrants, however, it is 16 percent lower.
7Within the RS framework one could also argue in the following way: If migration is perpetually
taking place, then migration with the same fertility rate for migrants as for the native population
is equivalent to a one-shot migration with migrants having higher fertility rates and leads to a gain
for future generations.
8In addition to this effect the skill level of natives in t + 1 may also fall due to unskilled
immigration. This may be the case e.g. if school teachers need to put a high effort into improving
the language skills of immigrant children, thereby slowing down the pace of instruction. Then, the
effective labor supply will fall even further.
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redistribution takes place between natives and immigrants.
Obviously, there are two counteracting effects: On the one hand, immigration may
have a positive effect on pension benefits in future periods due to relatively higher
fertility rates. On the other hand, immigration that is followed by a relatively poor
performance of immigrants’ children in attaining destination country-specific human
capital leads to falling pension benefits in t+ 1.
Voting outcome and conclusions
The voting outcome in period t can easily be derived. Let us first turn to the retirees
who maximize their pension benefit pt (according to equation (4)) with respect to the
level of immigration. We have already seen that immigration increases the pension
benefit, so the retirees will be in favor of boundless immigration. Turning to the
group of workers active in period t, the situation changes. As the model assumes
that the marginal products of factor inputs do not change, today’s wages remain
constant in the face of immigration. So, only the (discounted) future pension benefit
plays a role in their optimization problem. Under the assumptions of the RS model,
workers are indifferent with regard to immigration. However, considering differing
reproduction rates and skill distributions, we find that their voting behavior depends
on the parameter values for en and α. If the positive effect of relatively higher fertility
of immigrants more than offsets the negative effect of a relatively low skill level of
the immigrants’ offspring, allowing immigrants into the country will be the optimal
choice. If, however, the negative effect dominates, zero immigration will be voted
for. The decision of the working generation constitutes the final voting outcome if
we assume that the working generation is greater than the retired generation.
So, even if one does not consider any negative impact of immigration on gross wages,
it may be possible - unlike in RS where no generation will lose from immigration
- that zero immigration is the voting outcome. If one allows for a falling marginal
productivity of (unskilled) labor due to unskilled immigration, however, the young
and future generations are clearly hurt, as was shown in the simulation analysis in
Razin and Sadka (2000). This is also the driving force in other studies on the fiscal
consequences of unskilled immigration, such as Canova and Ravn (1998). They find
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that the previously existing level of redistribution to the unskilled can no longer be
sustained under these circumstances.
But even if wages drop, our findings show that a welfare gain may nevertheless occur:
When there is a strong positive effect on future pension benefits through very high
fertility rates of the immigrants or a high skill level, then even a negative impact of
immigration on wages may be compensated.9 This is in line with Storesletten (2000)
who finds in a more general framework that the fiscal problems associated with the
aging of the baby boom generation in the U.S. may be overcome by immigration
alone if the age and skill distribution as well as the number of immigrants is chosen
properly.10
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